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Željko Škuljević  
Faculty of Law  
University of Zenica

## PLEASURE AND MIND

*Prior to all, Plato opened hostility towards the body.*  
M. Onfray *Le gai savoir hédoniste*

Despite the title's strong allusion to Epicurus, his hedonism will be discussed somewhat later; we will begin with Plato's Philebus: what is Good and how should people live if they wish to achieve that notion (engaged in dialogue discussing this issue are Socrates, Philebus and Protarchus). Philebus claims that good life consists of enjoyment and pleasure while Socrates counters this with his intellectual principle according to which practical wisdom (*frónēsis*), thinking and recollection are much more beneficial for everything. How can one enjoy a musical piece, the sight of a work of art, but also food and drink; is enjoyment really an ideal one should strive towards? As neither enjoyment nor the mind constitute Good without the rest, the dialogue raises the issue whether there is something else, a third element, besides what Philebus and Socrates mentioned. In contradicting Protarchus' claim that all things pleasurable are Good, Socrates insists on the consideration of the notions of prudence (*frónēsis*), knowledge (*epistēmē*) and mind or intellect (*nus*) in order to define with certainty what Good, pleasure or prudence are. We shall now cite a piece from Plato's Philebus, part eleven titled *Union of Pleasure and Mind in Life*:

*«Protarchus: And what is this life of mind?*

*Socrates: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?*

*Protarchus: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.*

*Socrates:* What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

*Protarchus:* Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

*Socrates:* Yes, that is the life which I mean.

*Protarchus:* There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.

*Socrates:* But do you see the consequence?

*Protarchus:* To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.

*Socrates:* Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.

*Protarchus:* Certainly that seems to be true.

*Socrates:* And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus'<sup>1</sup> goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?

*Philebus:* . Neither is your "mind" the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.

*Socrates:* Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my "mind"; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.

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<sup>1</sup> Aphrodite serves here as a metonymy for enjoyment.

*Protarchus*: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.

*Socrates*: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?

*Protarchus*: Nonsense, Socrates.

*Socrates*: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility? » (21 e – 23 b).

Giving preference to the mind, not without irony however, and in constant distress not to upset delight, the Platonized Socrates again returns to the issue of Good: if it is neither *frónēsis* nor *hēdonē*, what else could it be then? The fact that good needs to be complete and self sufficient excludes the possibility of pleasure and prudence mixing. If either of the two was Good, then nothing should be lacking from them, otherwise it could not be the *real Good* (*tó óntos agathón*). However, according to hedonists those who have pleasure do not need anything else, not fronezis, not the mind and not judgment.<sup>2</sup> Even Savater's fictional Philebus says that the enchantment of love has nothing to do with thinking. Nothing besides pleasure is important. You have met me as such, «always in search of pleasure, with content for everything that cannot be expressed through caresses or the delightful spasm of a shuddering body».<sup>3</sup> As Philebus

<sup>2</sup> Plato's criticism of hedonism (at two different levels in *Gorgias* and *Philebus*) for the first time develops the notion of true and false need, i.e. true and false pleasure... The starting point for the criticism is the important connection between pleasure and displeasure: every pleasure also contains displeasure since pleasure is the removal of deficiencies, which are experienced as pain. Consequently, pleasure cannot be "good" and happiness because it contains its own opposition, unless some kind of "unmixed" pleasure significantly separated from displeasure can be found. H. Markuze *Kultura i društvo (O kritici hedonizma)*, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1977, p. 101.

<sup>3</sup> An original and witty literary-philosophical fiction in which Philebus seduces Plato and spends three days and three nights in lover's embrace with him during which the Academy was closed. After all of this, Philebus continued to attend his lectures, but tormented by one dilemma. Namely, «I would like to discuss with him one issue which I just cannot understand. That issue is: *What is pleasure, Plato, what is pleasure?* » F. Savater, *Platonova škola (Šta kaže Fileb)*, Rad, Belgrade, 1998, p. 56-59.

continues to insist that pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree, Socrates introduces the notion of *mind*, which is the «king of heaven and earth». Even though it appears that the union of hedone and nous, i.e. the combined life of pleasure and prudence, is that sought after way, the advantage is given to the mind, and this not without Platonic reasoning. Even in this combined life one should strive more towards nous than pleasure, consequently the second position that was sought for belongs to the mind. As prudence is more dominant than pleasure in the domain of good, that solution, despite the union, favors prudence and knowledge. Not even describing pleasure as a source with honey and prudence as clear and healthy natural water, or claiming that their combination provides the true value is able to help here. Despite Philebus' insistence on pleasure as Good, Socrates will stress that the «mind is better than pleasure and more useful in human life » (66 e). He also states meticulously that, according to the estimation produced by the discussion, pleasure can do no better than fifth position (67 a – b), and even convinces Protarchus to agree with him. The final lines of *Philebus*, or an ethnical dialogue on pleasure, stress that only based on knowledge can *true hedone* be revealed.

Nietzsche's description of Epicurus as moderately voluptuous<sup>4</sup> immediately raises suspicion of a Cyrenaic basis to his ethics. This suspicion is further strengthened by an excerpt from his *Letter to Menoeceus*. This is how he explains his position:

«When we say that pleasure is the *telos*, we do not mean the pleasures of the profligates and those that lie in sensual indulgence... We mean rather that one suffer no pain in one's body and no disturbance in one's soul» (*Men.* 131). In another fragment from his work *On Choices and Avoidances*, but also in his paper *On Moral Ends*, as well as in his letter to philosophers in Mytilene (D.L. X, 136.) he says that the absence of suffering and disturbance are Katastematic pleasures. Therefore, when Epicurus says that *telos* is pleasure what he actually has in mind is «Katastematic pleasure»: the absence of suffering represents the Katastematic

<sup>4</sup> «Yes, I am proud of perceiving the character of Epicurus differently from anyone else perhaps, and of enjoying the happiness of the afternoon of antiquity in all that I hear and read of him... never before was there such a moderation of voluptuousness» (Epikur, 45). F. Niče *Vesela nauka*, Grafos, Belgrade, 1984, p 75-76 (translated by M. Tabaković).

pleasure of the body, and the absence of disturbance represents the Katas-tematic pleasure of the soul. However, a fragment from his work *On the Telos or the Purpose of Life* he introduces something which appears as the addition of one more form of pleasure. Epicurus, just like members of the Cyrenaic School of Philosophy, calls it «pleasure in motion», or as some modern scholars would put it «kinetic pleasure». The fragment reads: »For I at least cannot conceive the good if I take away the pleasures due to tastes, the pleasures due to love (sex), the pleasures due to sounds, and the pleasant visual motions due to shape...» (Athen. 546 E; Cic. *Tusc. d.* III, 41). Athenaeus, one of the sources for this fragment, presents it as evidence that «not only Aristippus and his followers embraced kinetic pleasure, but so did Epicurus and his followers» (XII 546 E). Epicurus' differentiation of *static pleasures* (absence disturbance and suffering) and *moving pleasures* (happiness, joy) both confirms and denies him as a member of Cyrenaic school. The understanding of "life according to nature" as life according to pleasure stems from Cyrenaic sensualistic hedonism, however, the description of pleasure as the absence of suffering contradicts that Cyrenaic principle. By distinguishing corporal and spiritual pleasures (D.L. X, 136), and by equilibrating between them, his philosophy reminds of a «syncretic combination».<sup>5</sup> At one end is this corporal, «good behavior of the body», and in describing it he uses words such as flesh, belly etc., and at the other end is the spiritual pleasure which consists of thinking, even though it too depends on the feeling of corporal pleasure.<sup>6</sup> Spiritual pleasures are greater than corporal, because we can only feel the present and what is present with the body, while we can feel both the past and the future with the spirit (*corpore nisi praesens et quod adest sentire possumus, anima autem et praeterita et futura*, fr. 439). While some internal impression is the vessel of corporal pleasures, Epicurus calls it *dianoia* and Lucretius *anima*, an aggregate of fine fiery and aerial atoms distributed through the entire body, the vessel of spiritual pleasure is a specific

<sup>5</sup> «Epicurean philosophy is taken as a syncretic combination of Democritean physics and Cyrenaic morality...» K. Marks *Razlika između Demokritove i Epikurove filozofije prirode*, Kultura, Beograd, 1963, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> This dependence is revealed so that «besides the immediate pleasures there is also the anticipation of future pleasures, and even stronger than that, the memory of the past pleasures» (Plut. *Mor.* 1088 C, sf 1096 CF).

combination of atoms, *logicon*, the true organ of thinking, which Epicurus places in the heart, and which is capable of organizing sensory impressions into memories.<sup>7</sup> Spiritual pleasures are greater than corporal, Epicurus would say, just as spiritual pains are greater than corporal (D.L. X, 137). However, «not being hungry, not being thirsty, not being cold are all voices of the flesh. Those who have this and can hope to have it in the future can compete even with giants in pleasure» (*Gnom. Vat.* 33, cf Ael. *Varia historia* IV 13, Cic. *De. fin.* II 88). Absence of spiritual disturbance, *ataraxia*, represents the greatest happiness and pleasure, which again requires separation from the external world, from one's desires, passions, pains, lists.

Epicurus' elevation of the pleasures of mind is, according to Guthrie,<sup>8</sup> the main reason for the conflict of Aristippus' followers with his hedonism. Are the possibilities of mental pleasure being transformed into their impossibility? Is it even possible, as in the case of Epicurus, to create pleasure from mind or to make pleasure cerebral within hedonism? Even though Epicurean hedonism insists that pleasure is the greatest good, it also insists on a certain type of pleasure as the "true" one and opposes it to all other pleasures. The pleasure of the current need is often connected to a greater displeasure accompanying it and we therefore need to make a differentiation of individual pleasures.<sup>9</sup> There are needs and desires which, when they are satisfied, cause pain, constantly stimulate new desire and destroy spiritual peace. We often decline pleasures if we know that their consequence will be some form of displeasure. «Not even boozing and cheerfulness, not even rowdy wandering provide a pleasant life, just like inclination towards men or women doesn't provide it, or fish and other nice things...» Pleasant life is provided only by the mind (or by «sober thinking» as Đurić translates it), which critically evaluates and weighs reasons for choosing or rejecting, and which rejects wrong views that «represent the main cause of mental disturbances and anxiety».<sup>10</sup> It is the mind that allows man to indulge in moderate pleasure; its «insurmountable limitation» contradicts Philebus' limitlessness of pleasure, both in quantity and degree. According to Marcuse pleasures are distinguished

<sup>7</sup> Đurićev Predgovor Epikurovim *Osnovnim mislima...*, XXII – XXIII.

<sup>8</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie *History of Greek Philosophy*, p. 476

<sup>9</sup> H. Markuze *Kultura i društvo*, cit. izd., 97.

<sup>10</sup> Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 130 b – 132 a.

on the basis of the level of security and satisfaction they can provide. The principle of this so-called negative hedonism is primarily reflected in the dissatisfaction that needs to be avoided, rather than in the enjoyment that should be sought.<sup>11</sup>

Epicurus' exploitation of the mental peace of the «wise man» denies within itself both the notion of pleasure and the notion of the wise man:

«It is then that the ideal of the wise man indulged in pleasure is created, an ideal consisted of pleasure, but also of mind devoid of its sense. The wise man would then be the one whose mind (as well as pleasure) never goes too far, to the end (because he would then reach knowledge denying pleasure). His mind would be limited in advance and capable only of calculating risk and a mental technique of seizing the best from everything. Such a mind renounces the right to truth...»<sup>12</sup>

Even though hedonism represents the opposite end of the philosophy of mind, Marcuse finds both teachings, as well as the principles they support, incompatible. Both approaches establish, only abstractly, ways directing towards a truly humane society. As the notion of mind aims at generality within which the antagonistic interests of «empirical» individuals are relinquished, its practical realization of the individual, its happiness, equally remains something foreign, external... There is no harmony between the mind and happiness as the general and special interest. Believing in the harmony of both interests makes one a victim of the «necessary life-saving deception»: *the mind outwits individuals*.

Unlike Cyrenaic pleasure, which is positive and active, Epicurean pleasure is negative and reactive: it simply consists from the evasion of pain. One side considers the «insensitivity of the dead», while the other considers the abundance of life. Epicureans wish to quell within themselves passions, longings, the trials of enjoyment: «their model is a corpse which knows

<sup>11</sup> From Marcuse's mentioned book, excerpt *O kritici hedonizma*, p. 98.

<sup>12</sup> Fortune remains something exclusively subjective for hedonism, that connection to individualism, as well as deep relativism (inability of hedonism to apply the category of truth to fortune) does not prevent it to hold a correct judgment on society: «It can be derived from the antagonistic relations of labor that indulgence in sensual pleasures, not the ability of the mind, becomes the source of happiness. They are the true expression of the achieved level of the human mind, it is within them that the decision on possible freedom and possible happiness is made» (*Ibid*, 99).



nothing of hunger and thirst, of cold and warmness, of want and concern». They like physical suffering (and moral), they need pain to vividly show that they can overcome it. The Cyrenaics love energy that infuses them, they aspire to health by making vitality their ally, «the gay knowledge of hedonism». <sup>13</sup> Aristippus loves existence, «an Epicurean feast would be no more than an appetizer for the Cyrenaics...»

Aristippus unquestionably knew Socrates, the Sophists, and, of course, Plato, with whom he spent a lot of time at the court of Dionysius of Syracuse. He was also familiar with his teachings, the Theory of Ideas, in which he saw «universal suspicion launched against the body and pleasure». Diogenes of Sinope, his lamp and plucked chicken, albeit in the form of an anecdote, show how a Cynic philosopher defends a nominalistic position against Ideas:

«In search for Man, an Idea of man according to Plato, nothing is found, not even with a lamp in broad daylight. It is the same with trying to define that category or trying to reduce to a handful of words the types of *two-footed featherless animals*. The plucked chicken thrown by Diogenes to his feet will force Plato to add: *a two-footed featherless animal*, undoubtedly, but *with broad nails*... No one doubts that Aristippus also thinks against Plato *et vice versa*...»<sup>14</sup>

As Diogenes of Sinope, a Cynic Cyrenaic, used body language to present his philosophy, he considered bodily functions the best evidence of his own thought. Peter Sloterdijk considered him the founder of so-called pantomimic materialism,<sup>15</sup> because of the fact that Diogenes used animal qualities of the human body as an argument. Seeing his life as a method of philosophizing, he often stressed that bodily functions are something entirely natural. As they were merely a form of language<sup>16</sup> for him, he often used the body as an efficient means to show to collocutors that their reliance

<sup>13</sup> M. Onfray *L'art de jouir (Le gai savoir hédoniste)*, Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1991, 233- 300.

<sup>14</sup> M. Onfray *L'invention du plaisir (Une machine de guerre antiplatonicienne)*, cit. izd., 31.

<sup>15</sup> P. Sloterdijk *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 207.

<sup>16</sup> D. Marić *Kinici i metafizika (Tjelesna retorika ili Diogenesova majeutika)*, Hijatus, Zenica, 2000, 139- 142, 145.



on theory alone in fact represents their descent into *tyfos* (arrogance, vanity). The body alone «grants nature's approval to his behavior» (Branham) no matter how scandalous or labeled as «scornful shamelessness» it may be. Diogenes thought that people felt embarrassed by entirely wrong things, by bodily things, things that are a part of their nature, while instead they should feel embarrassed by blind faith in inherited values, greed for wealth and power, lies etc.<sup>17</sup> The departure from *tyfos* provides life in accordance with nature; achieving *atyfia* requires exercise which liberates our mind from the generally accepted «values», customs and opinions, and rids our body from unnecessary things thus making it more resilient. Even though Onfray says that he was the first to declare hostility towards the body, Plato certainly dealt with it, and, of course, dwelt within it. In *The Symposium*, as he draws a distinction between celestial and earthly (demi)gods (180d), Plato writes that the common or earthly Eros, as well as the common or earthly Aphrodite inhabit the souls of common people (181 b). And they equally love women and boys, they care more about the body than the soul; ultimately, the basic goal for these «common people» is to achieve certain erotic pleasure, and in order to achieve that more easily they turn towards senseless creatures (181 b). This common, carnal or bodily love considers the beautiful irrelevant...<sup>18</sup> Deliberately leaving aside the modern perception of the so-called correct *paidierastia* (211 b 5), Diotima's messages of love to Socrates, in bodily terms, represent only the first step on the path to improvement and achieving perfection at eroticism (211 c). Therefore, the conception of love is now not based on depictions of sensual pleasure, Pavlović says, but on a different form of pleasure, pleasure arising from contemplation. Sensuality is depreciated

<sup>17</sup> The philosophic meaning of Cynic shamelessness is largely concealed in darkness, says Maric, because of the Platonic and Christian tradition, «which saw nothing but incident in the exposure of the body» (*Ibidem*).

<sup>18</sup> Plato's Pausanias discovered friendship as a higher form of love, and then allegorically connects this ennobled love with the heavenly Eros and the heavenly Aphrodite. Heavenly Eros, according to him, does not participate in the feminine, but only in the masculine, and therefore those obsessed by them choose *paidierastia* and love what is by stronger and wiser by nature (181 cd). Only that and such love, Pausanias claims, creates permanent and firm bonds of friendship (182 c), only it at the same time represents lover towards wisdom (???) – *philosophia* (183 a). B.U. Pavlović *Platonova erotika*, 22-23 (Predgovor u Platon *Gozba*, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1983).

here as an independent element of pleasure and is left to act merely as a mediator between the mind and the object of intellectual contemplation. The object of contemplation (theory) in Plato's reasoning is always some form of beauty *resp.* good, however, not even the mediators dwell in expanses of ugliness. It is no accident that the path towards perfection in eroticism, ennoblement of love, begins with watching a beautiful body. The next steps include the marking of two or more beautiful bodies, and, ultimately, the discovery that all beautiful bodies are only one form, the lowest, in which beauty makes itself manifest (211 c). Be that as it may, platonic contemplation also begins with the understanding of corporal beauty as such.

Even though Epicurus argued that spiritual pleasures give rise to greater joys than the carnal ones, a point we have just demonstrated, he, nevertheless, refuses to accept any pleasure that is not a product of direct sensual pleasure. At one point he even ridicules the preachers of false virtue in the *Epistle to Anaxarchus*: «I for my part incite and call you to continual pleasures, and not to vain and empty virtues, which have nothing but turbulent hopes of uncertain fruits» (Plut. *Mor.* 1117 A). The body and the bodily simply cannot be removed from the structure of pleasures, as it, being cerebral contains the highest possible and most lasting of pleasures. Or, in the words of Epicurus, «good condition of the body and firm reliance on its future contain the highest and most lasting pleasure for those who think correctly» (Plut. *Mor.* 1089 D). He does not even shy away from Cynic candidness when, in his opposition to all «constructive ethics», he teasingly emphasizes the carnal by using words such as *meat (sárks)* and stomach: «The beginning and root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach, even wisdom and culture must be referred to this» (Athen. 546 F; cf. Plut. *Moralia* 1098 D, 1125 A). The source of all good lies in the body, that is the basic law, that is the rule, the order of things.<sup>19</sup> Metrodoros, in his *Epistle to Timocrates*, also said that the root of all good and beautiful is the stomach, «that it is the measure of everything related to bliss, that there is no point in working on the prosperity of Helens and earning wreaths from them as a reward for wisdom, instead one should eat and drink, but do so by not harming the stomach and in a way that will bring pleasure»

<sup>19</sup> *Fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem esse naturae*, fr. 400 Us.

(fr. 39 idd. Koerte). Some researchers do not see in this the celebration of the bodily, but its eradication, disappearance. If pleasure represents the absence of wishes, and the stomach is the place where wishes originate, it is then possible to understand that wisdom dwells there and that this is the place where the fires of passion need to be quelled. The stomach is a miserable part worthy of content, disappearance and destruction. Work on its destruction alone will bring pleasure and it is for this reason that it will result in the achievement of ataxia or absolute peace of the soul. It is precisely because of the principle, which Epicurus made so notorious, that one should eradicate wish within oneself, that the tradition of ascetic ideal attracted such strong following.<sup>20</sup>

Nietzsche in his *Gay Science* presents the opinion that *the body plays an important role in the life of a philosopher*. None other than Nietzsche, he who was aware of migraine, eye inflammation, nausea, vomiting, and a number of other various illnesses, would say that every philosophy can be reduced to the confessions of a body, the autobiography of a being in pain. Thought, therefore, does not descend from heaven, but rises from the body, emerges from the flesh and springs from the guts:

«What philosophizes in the body is nothing else but strength and weakness, power and powerlessness, health and sickness, the great game of carnal passions. In a different portion of the text Nietzsche talks about the body as a *Big Sagacity*.»<sup>21</sup>

Since there is no philosophy without philosophers, and no philosophers without a body, we wonder what kind of a body would suit hedonistic philosophy? What embodiment should a lustful thought have, Onfray asks, and what element should be at the core of subjectivity burning with joy? If the body is a special place where maps of different worldviews are drawn, it is then clear that it would be impossible to philosophize without asking questions about the properties of that thinking matter. Which body is that? Which *I* is thinking?<sup>22</sup> *In addition to one philosophy*

<sup>20</sup> Onfray said that prior to all, Plato opened hostility towards the body, and the Epicureans and Stoics, Alexandrians and primitive Christians then followed: «they would give death solid assistants, looking for a body to bend them to breaking point and give them an inhuman shape» (M. Onfray *L'art de jouir*, cit. izd., 242-243).

<sup>21</sup> M. Onfray *Moć postojanja (Hedonistički manifest)*, Rad, Beograd, 2007, 63

<sup>22</sup> M. Onfray *Gastronomski um (U prilog jednoj filozofiji koja bi bila proširena na telo)*, Gradac, bibliot. «Cveće zla», Čačak-Belgrade, 2002, 229-230.

*that would be extended to the body* it is stated that it is, at the same time, powerful and weak, strong and fragile, «because it is still the body of a child which continues to search for answers, to ask why and because of what? It also possesses a hypersensibility, which many consider an ailment: «Refined enjoyments, fine pleasures, delicate feelings, subtle and philosophical hedonism would not be possible without sensual and emotional abilities amplified tenfold.»<sup>23</sup> The necessary corporality of philosophy, its dependence on «physical constitution», the body and embodiment, blood and lymph, engenders two different philosophical concepts. It is not the absence of corporality that is the issue, this simply is not possible; *there are no philosophers without a body*: skinny or gigantic, feeble or solar, open to life or prone to death:

«A body dappled with lightning and rutted by flows, a volcanic body bristling with energy, a body ablaze and on fire, excited and passionate; or, rather, a body already charred by death and vengeance, a body covered by slag and ooze, immersed into mud where it decomposes in pain.»<sup>24</sup> Appropriate philosophies are derived from these two bodies: a *hedonistic angel* fits the first one, while ascetic bodies fit the second. It is Onfray's neologism precisely *hedonistic angel* that attempts to incarnate the forgotten body of philosophy. It is some kind of a spiritualized body which includes both ethical and esthetical concerns, an «amendment of the soul.» Therefore, the body invoked by the «hedonistic angel» is a product of culture. It is not a method of pure naturalness, some crude combination of atoms, a senseless aggregate of matter. It is not materialism to which its opponents wish to reduce it because of ideological reasons: a simplified, reductionistic and bleak conception of the world...<sup>25</sup> Yes, the hedonistic body is much more than a «mere sum reducible to a physician's manual of anatomy.»

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.

<sup>25</sup> V. Citot *Razgovor s Mishelom Onfrayom*, *Europski glasnik* (br. 8), HFD, Zagreb, 2003, 992